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Government and non-government conservation agencies have long-term goals and 
objectives to provide environmental services, such as conserving the biodiversity of 
Australian native vegetation. In addition to national parks and reserves, private lands 
are often included in conservation programs to achieve these objectives. Formal 
contracts are entered into between the private landholder and the conservation agency 
to provide environmental services, or more commonly to provide inputs that are likely 
to lead to environmental services. The paper examines the costs and benefits of 
monitoring these conservation contracts when biodiversity change is stochastic.  
INTRODUCTION 
In Australia, government and non-government conservation agencies have begun 
incorporating private lands into conservation programs primarily due to the high cost of 
establishing national parks and reserves (Figgis 2004).  The land available to enter 
national parks and reserves will be insufficient for reserves alone to achieve the 
conservation agency’s goals and objectives of biodiversity and environmental service 
provision into the future.  The goals and objectives of government and non-government 
conservation agencies are diverse, but consistently include broad environmental aims 
which require long-term investment. For example, the Australian Government 
Department of the Environment and Water Resources develops and implements national 
policy, programmes and legislation to ensure the protection, conservation and sustainable 
use of Australia’s natural environment, water resources and cultural heritage (DEWR 
2007). The World Wide Fund for Nature state their mission is to stop the degradation of 
the planet’s natural environment and to build a future in which humans live in harmony 
with nature by: conserving the world’s biological diversity; ensuring that the use of 
renewable natural resources is sustainable; and promoting the reduction of pollution and 
wasteful consumption (WWF 2007). The broad, long-term nature of the goals and 
objectives of conservation agencies require them to make long-term investments in 
diverse conservation work. 
Government and non-government conservation agencies have introduced a number of 
conservation schemes and programs designed to provide biodiversity and 
environmental services on private land through market- based instruments (Figgis 3 
 
2004). Development of new conservation programs in Australia has progresses rapidly, 
with 19 pilot programs within the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality 
alone (NAPSWQ 2008). In Western Australia, for example, landholders can receive a 
wide range of support for providing environmental services, including financial or 
labour assistance for conservation works, assistance entering into a covenant, as well as 
technical advice and training (Government of Western Australia 2004). Internationally, 
conservation programs have existed for much longer than Australian, . Mmost well 
known are the USA Conservation Reserve Program and the Wetlands Reserve Program 
(Hanrahan and Zinn 2005), and the UK Countryside Stewardship Scheme and 
Environmental Stewardship (NE 2006). Typically conservation schemes contract 
landholders to undertake actions which increase the probability of establishing or 
conserving a target vegetation community.   
A conservation agency or their agent (regulator) who is paying landholders’ 
compensation for retiring land and/or undertaking revegetation actions is expected to 
measure the output of the scheme by monitoring the actions of landholders and 
subsequent vegetation succession, as well as possibly taking action(s) based on this 
information. Based on the information from monitoring, the regulator may even alter or 
cease the contract with the landholder. The regulator must decide on the optimal 
frequency and accuracy of monitoring, as well as the subsequent action(s) to take.  
The monitoring of conservation contract compliance by landholders and the 
environmental outcomes of contracts by regulators has received limited attention in the 
literature. Internationally, reviews of agri-environmental policy monitoring in the UK 
and elsewhere conclude that monitoring to assess ecosystem change incurs significant 
costs and is prone to inaccuracy in the form of mis-classifications of vegetation types 
(Hooper 1992; National Audit Office 1997; World Bank 1998). A wide variety of 
monitoring techniques are available to the regulator, each with a unique combination of 
accuracy, cost and ease of use, notable are satellite images such as Landsat, aerial 
photographs, and ground surveys. The USA Conservation Security Program takes the 
unusual approach of providing funds directly to farmers for undertaking recordkeeping, 
monitoring, and evaluation themselves (Farm Policy Team 2006).  
The economics of environmental monitoring has its origins with Becker’s (1968) model 
of crime and punishment which predicts that the decision to offend depends upon a 
comparison of the expected benefits with the expected costs (Heyes 2000).  The 
economics of Becker ’s model predicts that regulators will fix fines as high as possible, 
monitor infrequently to reduce costs (if fines are punitive) and always prosecute 
transgressors. Harrington (1988) uses a dynamic model from tax regulation (Greenberg 
1984) to explain why the observed practices in air and water pollution monitoring are at 
odds with Becker’s model.  Harrington’s (1988) highlights the facts that firms are rarely 
fined and fines are small, monitoring frequency is low, and yet most firms comply most 
of the time.  
Environmental monitoring and decision making has also been covered within the 
adaptive control literature, reviewed by Walters and Holling (1990) and White (2000).  
However, this literature focuses on the control of state variables, such as biomass which 4 
 
can be represented by continuous variables;, for instance , see Williams’ (1996) model of 
wildfowl harvesting.  Operations research has approached monitoring as part of a 
general stochastic control literature, see , for instance, Bertsekas and Shreve (1978).  
The partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) model (Monahan 1982; 
Smallwood and Sondik 1973) is a tractable approach to stochastic control when the 
states follow a Markov chain, but the decision maker is unable to observe the current 
state of the system.  To date POMDP has had relatively few applications in 
environmental and natural resource economics, although the paper on salmon fishing by 
Lane (1989) is a notable exception. 
In ecology, Markov chains have been used to represent vegetation successions (Barber 
1978; Usher 1979) with methods for estimating transition probabilities from 
observations of the states of a system through time (Anderson and Goodman 1957).  
Recently ecologists used Markov chains to represent the stability of a heterogeneous 
ecosystem over time as well as space (Li 1995). More recent advances in the 
methodology have enabled the analysis of succession within various ecosystem types 
(Logofet and Korotkov 2002; Logofet and Lesnaya 2000; Plotnick and Gardner 2002; 
Tucker and Anand 2005), from grasslands (Balzter 2000; Somodi et al. 2004) to forests 
(Korotkov et al. 2001; Yemshanov and Perera 2002) and marine communities (Liu et al. 
2006). 
The monitoring problem described here differs from most previous contributions to the 
literature in two fundamental respects.  First the variable monitored is a categorical 
variable classifying the state of the vegetation community into a finite number of classes.  
Most previous economic studies describe monitoring an emission variable where 
standards are in terms of quantities or concentrations.  Secondly, the monitoring 
problem here is dynamic and extends from 2 periods up to potentially an infinite time 
horizon.  Given this added complexity the strategic interaction between the firm and the 
regulator is not modelled explicitly, instead in the model it is characterised as ‘nature’ 
which determines if whether a conservation scheme succeeds or fails. 
Most Australian market- based conservation contract schemes are in a trial stage and 
will require further development to meet the long-term and wide ranging goals of 
conservation agencies. Particularly, the monitoring and enforcement of the legal 
contract between the agency and the landholder to ensure the environmental objectives 
of the scheme are achieved requires further attention. At present, monitoring of the 
compliance and environmental outcomes of these schemes is primarily focused on 
efficient allocation mechanisms. The success of conservation schemes is generally 
measure by the quantity of inputs contracted to be supplied, rather than the quantity of 
inputs achieved or environmental services provided. 
The aim of this paper is to use POMDP to explore the regulator’s decision to enter into 
different types of conservation contracts with landholders, whether to monitor and, 
when monitoring occurs the regulator’s response to the observation. The simplified case 
study investigates the regulator’s decision to contract landholders to revegetate or 
maintain native vegetation for one year, and the use of monitoring of the vegetation 
succession to change the contract type or to withdraw from contract. The unit of 5 
 
analysis is an area of land which either had or has the potential to establish the target 
vegetation community.  This analysis draws upon the ecology literature on how 
vegetation successions are modelled, the economic analysis of monitoring and 
irreversible environmental change and the operations research analysis of dynamic 
monitoring and control problems.  Each of these strands is discussed. The next section 
introduces the POMDP model.  Section 3 describes the case- study details for the 
conservation and restoration of Salmon Gum woodland in the Western Australian 
Wheatbelt and gives the POMDP results.  Section 4 concludes. 
METHODOLOGY 
PARTIALLY OBSERVABLE MARKOV DECISION PROCESSES 
A regulator wishes to maximise the private and public value of a piece of land where 
vegetation communities are described by N discrete states  1,..., i s N = .  The vegetation 
community changes through time according to a Markov process and the (NxN) matrix 
of transition probabilities are a function of the level of conservation effort; for instance, 
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The elements  ( ) ij t p e  give the probability of the land in state i being in state j after a 
single period t.  Conservation effort,  t e , is a measure of resources allocated to 
conservation, in the example it is based on the work of Yates and Hobbs (1997) and 
Gibbons and Freudenberger (2006).  The regulator offers a contract that stipulates 
conservation effort  t e .  Conservation effort increases or decreases the probability of a 
transition to the target vegetation community. 
The regulator has a prior probability of the current vegetation community being in a 
given state by the (1xN) vector π  known in the POMDP literature as the belief state.  For 
many ecosystems this is a realistic assumption:  vegetation classifications are uncertain 
or the vegetation may be a mosaic of different vegetation classes.  Often the high cost of 
a definitive vegetation survey means that conservation schemes are initialised with 
incomplete knowledge of the initial vegetation community across the whole area. The 
observation matrix, which is a function of monitoring effort  t u determines the accuracy 
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where the element  ( ) j t r u θ  is the probability that if state θ  is observed the vegetation at 
the end of period t is j.  If  ( ) t u Θ  is an identity matrix then monitoring is perfectly 
accurate; if it is uniform it is uninformative.  Increased monitoring effort raises the 
probability of a correct observation. 
Monitoring reduces the uncertainty about which state the land is in and updates the 
prior probability to a posterior probability by Bayes rule: 
1
1 ,
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
it ij t j t i
jt
it ij t j t i j
p e r u
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The new belief state is a 1 N ×  vector of probabilities. In vector form, (3) can be 
rewritten as: 
  1 ( | , , ) t t t t T e u π π θ − =               (4) 
where T(.) is the belief transformation function.  The belief state captures the history of 
all past observations and actions. 
MONITORING COSTS 
Heyes (2002) draws a useful distinction between inspecting an environmental variable 
which generates a noisy signal and an environmental audit which is definitive. Methods 
for monitoring vegetation community change range from low- cost remote sensing 
methods such as aerial photographs and satellite images, to relatively high- cost field 
surveys (World Bank 1998). We assume that from past ‘ground truthing’, these methods 
have established observation matrices.  For instance remote sensing methods are known 
for relatively high probabilities of misclassification (Hooper 1992), while intensive field 
surveys are more accurate but more expensive.  
We assume that the cost of monitoring depends on the observation matrix so the quasi-
convex monitoring cost function  ( )
v
t c u is at a maximum when  ( ) u Θ is an identity 
matrix. That is, the state is observed with perfect accuracy, and  ( ) 0
v
t c u =  when  0 t u =  
and  ( ) u Θ is a uniform matrix with all elements equal to 1/N. 
THE REGULATOR’S PROBLEM 
The regulator maximises the expected present-value of the welfare function in relation 
to conserving an area of land by choosing conservation effort and monitoring effort.  The 
regulator’s problem can be represented by the following POMDP problem represented 
in a mathematical programming problem 
  ,
[ ] [ ( ) ( ) ( )]
t t
v t
t it i t i t t t i wrt e u
V Maximise g e c e c u π π δ = − − ∑ ∑       (5a) 
Subject to 
1 ( | , , ) t t t t T e u π π θ − =                 (5b) 7 
 
0 π π = %                    (5c) 
The first term  ( ) i t g e  in (5a) gives the non-market net benefits of vegetation community 
i. It is given as a function of et as conservation effort may enhance the benefits of a 
particular state.  The term  ( ) i t c e gives the resource cost to the regulator/landholder of 
conservation effort in state et.  Monitoring costs depend upon the monitoring effort and 
are given by  ( )
v
t c u .  The term 
t t g) 1 /( 1 + = δ is the discount factor which converts net 
benefits generated at time t to their present-value at t=0, g is the discount rate.  Equation 
(5b) gives the updating equation for the belief state (4) and (5c) gives the belief state 
(prior probabilities of states) at the start of the planning horizon when t=0 as π % .  To 
simplify the notation in later sections we define net-benefit as 
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
v
i t t i t i t t w e u g e c e c u = − −               (6) 
DYNAMIC OPTIMISATION 
Unlike a Markov Decision Problem (MDP) which has a standard dynamic programming 
solution (Puterman, 1994), the solution to a POMDP problem is more difficult because 
the probability of the system being in a particular state depends upon past monitoring 
and the resulting observations.  The original solution by Smallwood and Sondik (1973) 
introduces the notion of a belief state where the conventional states of MDP, namely  i s , 
are replaced by a belief state  t π  which is the vector of probabilities of being in the states.  
The solution entails finding a set of actions which are optimal across the belief state 
(Cassandra 1995).  In a simplified form the optimisation problem is to solve the 
following version of Bellman’s equation: 
1 i ,
[ ] maximise  { ( , ) ( ) ( ) [ ( | , , )]}
t t
t t it i t t ij t j t t t t t j e u
V w e u p e r u V T e u θ θ π π π θ + = + ∑ ∑ ∑ .  (7) 
where  ( ) t t V π  is the optimal value from optimizing across the time horizon from t to T 
starting in belief state  t π .  The optimal value comprises two components. The first term 
is the expected immediate reward and the second term is the expected reward for the 
remaining periods. The term  ( ) ( ) ij t j t p e r u θ  gives the joint probability of observing state 
θ  when the previous state is i and the current state j. Equation (7) is similar in 
construction to a standard stochastic dynamic programming model. The only difference 
is in the presence of the belief state.  For instance if the initial state was known with 
certainty and there was no monitoring, optimization would proceed by maximizing the 
current net-benefit whilst accounting for the effect that the action has on the expected 
value across the remaining periods.  This principle of optimality still holds in POMDP 
except it has to solve the problem for all possible belief states.  This involves defining the 
optimal solution as a set of action vectors which are optimal in some belief state.  This is 
illustrated and discussed in greater detail in the context of the case study. 
Solving the dynamic optimization problem presented in Equation (7) is not trivial due to 
the problems of determining  [ ] t t V π .  However, if we restrict  t e and  t u  to a discrete set of 8 
 
values we can make use of the result that  [ ] t t V π  is always piecewise linear and convex 
(Smallwood and Sondik 1973). Thus a modified dynamic programming algorithm can 
determine  [ ] t t V π  as a set of vectors generated from different actions.  This allows us to 
rewrite (7) as: 
( , , , )
i ,




t t it i t t ij t j t j j e u
V w e u p e r u t
ι π θ
θ θ π π α = + + ∑ ∑ ∑    (8) 
where  ( )
k
j t α is a (1xN) policy vector which gives the expected payoff from an action 
across all the states. The superscript on the policy vector gives the optimal vector for a 
particular belief state and is formally defined as follows: 
( , , , ) argmax ( ) ( ) ( 1)
k
t t t it ij t j t j i j
k
e u p e r u t θ ι π θ π α   = +   ∑ ∑         (9) 
Tthat is, it selects the vector, by the superscript k, which gives the highest expected 
value for the belief state resulting from the prior probability, action and observation.  
CASE STUDY 
BACKGROUND 
The Western Australian wheatbelt, and particularly the Northeastern Wheatbelt 
Regional Organisation of Councils (NEWROC), has received attention recently due to its 
agricultural and environmental importance. The area is of agricultural significance as 
well as having biodiversity that is under threat from salinity and large scale clearing. 
The NEWROC comprises the shires of Koorda, Mount Marshall, Mukinbudin, Nungarin, 
Trayning, Westonia and Wyalkatchem. The majority of the NEWROC (69%) is contained 
within the Land and Water Australia’s Intensive Land-use Zone1, with the remainder 
(31%) within the Extensive Land-use Zone. In 2002, 12% of NEWROC was remnant 
vegetation. Within each shire the area of remnant vegetation ranged from 5% in the 
south- west shire of Wyalkatchem to 21% in the eastern most shire of Westonia. 
Yates and Hobbs (1997) detail the state of Eucalyptus woodlands in southeast and 
southwest Australia. Woodlands have been extensively cleared and much of them are 
badly degraded due to livestock grazing. Currently it is estimated that only 10% of 
Eucalyptus loxophleba (York gum) and 20% of Eucalyptus salmonophloia/Eucalyptus 
salubris (salmon gum/gimlet) woodlands remain. A similar situation exists on the east 
coast of Australia, where 0.01% of eucalyptus albens (white box) woodland remains 
relatively unmodified.  
                                                             
1 Intensive Land-use Zone: the area of Australia where intensive land use practices such as 
irrigated agriculture occur. 
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The removal of degrading factors such as grazing and weeds may be insufficient to 
restore the woodland, with revegetation action required. Yates and Hobbs (1997) go on 
to identify the stable woodland states that exist in Eucalyptus salmonophloia woodlands 
currently and the transitions required to shift the woodland areas from one state to 
another. Remnant vegetation in the NEWROC area is highly fragmented due to 
agricultural clearing, and degraded due to weeds, livestock grazing and firewood 
collection. Together with the impact of dryland salinity this means high levels of habitat 
loss, with the remaining vegetation severely degraded. The works required and 
probability of their success is largely determined by the current state of the woodland 
and its ability to shift to another state. The fencing of remnant vegetation to remove 
livestock and feral grazing may be insufficient to return a degraded woodland to an 
undegraded state. Extensive revegetation and weed control would likely be required to 
achieve this shift. 
MARKOV CHAIN ESTIMATION 
The states and transitions identified by Yates and Hobbs (1997) in salmon gum 
woodland are simplified to the diagram given in Figure 1 for this case study. Combining 
the characteristics detailed by Yates and Hobbs with aerial photography of the NEWROC 
gives 4 vegetation states; Undegraded Woodland, Degraded Woodland1, Degraded 
Woodland2 and Agricultural. Undegraded Woodland (Undegw) has an intact understory 
of shrubs, a layer of plant litter across the ground and good soil. Degraded Woodland1 
(Degw1) is a remnant of native vegetation, where the vegetation quality is poor, with a 
few perennial understory species, a ground layer of annual weeds and compacted soil. 
Degraded Woodland2 (Degw2) is a remnant of native vegetation with clearing, likely by 
grazing or crop production, leaving only a mixture of endemic perennial grasses and 
annual weeds with a few trees. Agriculture (Agric) refers to a stable state of annual 
rotations of crop or livestock production on the land. Figure 2 gives an example of the 
classification of remnants in NEWROC into Undegw, Degw1, Degw2 and Agric. 
The transition between vegetation states is unique for each action available to the 
regulator, Figure 1. In this case study the regulator can enter into (1) a contract for 
revegetation works as described by conservation schemes such as Auctions for 
Landscape Recovery in WA (Gole et al. 2005) (Reveg), (2) a contract for maintenance of 
existing remnant vegetation as described by Lockwood et al (2000) (Maintain), or (3) 
not enter into a contract, i.e. the status quo of voluntary revegetation works, grazing, etc. 
as the landholder desires (No Contract). Reveg requires the landholder to undertake a 
range of management actions to restore the land to a higher quality of remnant. This 
includes fencing the remnant, planting of woodland species, controlling weeds, rabbits and 
foxes and corridor construction. Maintain requires the landholder to fence large remnants 
but they are allowed limited grazing and collection of firewood or fence post timber in 
the area provided it is consistent with biodiversity conservation. No Contract refers to 
abandoning the remnant to the landholder’s preference, or the status quo. Each action 
has an associated benefit and cost, and expected impact on the transition between 
vegetation states on the land. The action choice by the regulator changes the net benefit 
( , ) i t t w e u  by altering  ( ) i t g e  and ( ) i t c e , detailed later. The transition probabilities for 
each action choice by the regulator and land type (Table 10) give the predicted start and 10 
 
end state of the land over 1 period, in this case annually. The transition probabilities are 
an average for the NEWROC, incorporating differences in topography, climate, 
landholder skill and landholder compliance across the region.  
 




FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE OF CLASSIFICATION OF VEGETATION STATES OF LAND IN THE NEWROC AREA. 
 
Aerial photographs and Geographic Information System (GIS) data is analysed to 




No Contract what activity? 
Maintain or No Contract 
Revegetation or Maintenance 
Agriculture 
Maintain or No 
Contract 
Revegetation, Maintenance 
or No Contract 
Revegetation or Maintenance 11 
 
steps in converting aerial photographs or GIS data into Markov transition probabilities 
include: (1) entering the images, (2) calibrating the classification system, (3) classifying 
the attributes of the images, (4) converting the attributes to states using principle 
components analysis, and (5) extracting the Markov transition probabilities. The 
transition probability matrix for the status quo (No Contract) was estimated from aerial 
photography of a subsection of NEWROC from 1962, 1972, 1984, 1996 and 2004. The 
transition probability matrix for Reveg and Maintain were estimated based on the matrix 
calculated for No Contract (Table 1). 
To estimate the No Contract Markov transition probabilities the aerial photographs 
spatially rectified (georeferenced or orthorectified) to ensure accuracy of the landscape 
area topography and scale using ARC-GIS. The areas of remnant vegetation present in 
1962 were identified and re-identified in each following photograph to observe their 
attributes such as colour, homogeneity of colour, if joined to another remnant. The 
remnant attributes were then evaluated using principle components analysis into the 
four vegetation states of Undegw, Degw1, Degw2 and Agric. The transitions between 
states for each vegetation remnant between photographs gave the longer term Markov 
chain transition probability matrix for the status quo (No Contract).  The transition 
probabilities are converted from a longer time span to an annual basis using the 
techniques outlined in Craig and Sendi (2002). 
 
TABLE 1 PROBABILITY OF TRANSITION BETWEEN STATES GIVEN SELECTED ACTION 
No Contract         
  Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
Undeg  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Degw1  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.3 
Degw2  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.1 
Agric  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0 
         
Revegetation Contract         
  Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
Undeg  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Degw1  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0 
Degw2  0.1  0.5  0.4  0.0 
Agric  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.1 
         
Maintenance Contract         
  Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
Undeg  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Degw1  0.1  0.7  0.2  0.0 
Degw2  0.0  0.1  0.8  0.1 
Agric  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0 
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The state of the land and choice of action and monitoring determine the net benefit to 
the regulator of the land for each period of the analysis. The cost of contracting land 
( ( ) i t c e ) for revegetation (Reveg) is $86 per hectare per year (Gole et al. 2005), and 
maintenance of current vegetation (Maintain) is $42 per hectare per year (Lockwood et 
al. 2000). While not entering a contract (No Contract) does not incur a cost or provide a 
benefit to the regulator. Land being in the state of Undegw or Degw1 provides a benefit 
to wider society and the regulator, or non-market value. The community willingness to 
pay for remnant native woodland vegetation in the Murray catchment of New South 
Wales is used as an estimate of the benefit to wider society and regulator of salmon gum 
woodland in NEWROC ( ( ) i t g e ); $91 per hectare per year for Undeg and $46 per hectare 
per year for Degw1 (Lockwood et al. 2000). Monitoring the land to determine its current 
vegetation state requires engaging a local expert and is estimated to cost (cm) $8 per 
hectare per year (Gole et al. 2005). 
The regulator is able to engage an expert to monitor/assess the land and estimate its 
current state to inform their future decisions. The probability that this monitoring 
correctly estimates the current state of the land is given in Table 2. Without monitoring 
the regulator does not know what the state of the land is when deciding their action 
choice.. The combinations of conservation contract type and monitoring effort give six 
different action options for the regulator to choice from in total.  
 
TABLE 2 OBSERVATION PROBABILITIES FOR NO CONTRACT, MAINTAIN AND REVEG. 
  Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
Undeg  0.8  0.2  0  0 
Degw1  0.1  0.8  0.1  0 
Degw2  0  0.1  0.8  0.1 
Agric  0  0  0.2  0.8 
 
RESULTS 
The POMDP analysis was run over a specified number of periods to compare the optimal 
contract type for the regulator and also whether they engage in monitoring, in both the 
short term and the longer term. A discount rate (g) of 5%, i.e. discount factor of 
95 . 0 = δ , is assumed for all analysis. 
THREE-PERIOD ANNUAL PLANNING HORIZON 
Were the regulator’s time horizon only 3 periods, or 3 years, the optimal action 
sequence for the regulator is either three periods of No Contract, or an initial period of 
Reveg and then No Contract for 2 years. The policy graph in Figure 3Error! Reference 
source not found. illustrates the sequence of actions (Action Set). The right had column 
gives the set of optimal actions for a 1-period problem, the next column the initial action 
of a 2-period time horizon and the left column the initial action in a 3 period time 
horizon. The 3 period Action Set beginning with Reveg without Monitoring (Action Set 0) 13 
 
is therefore made up of the optimal action of Reveg without Monitoring in the initial 
period and then the optimal action of a 2-period decision and a 1-period decision. 
The optimal initial action and action sequence is determined by the regulator’s belief 
about the initial state of the land. In the three period case were the regulator 100% 
certain the land was Agric the optimal sequence of actions is No Contract in the initial 
period and all following periods (Action Set 1, Table 3Error! Reference source not 
found.). If the regulator thought there was a 50% probability the land was Undegw and 
50% it was Degw1 the benefit from Action Set 0 is 0.5*224+0.5*58=$141, and Action Set 
1 $114, so Action Set 0 is optimal. The calculation of the net present value of Action Set 0 
i.e. beginning with Reveg without Monitoring in Period 3, when the initial state of the 
land is Degw1 is detailed below for illustration; 
NPV = Period t=1 + Period t=2 + Period t=3 
= (0.5*-17.75+0.5*-40.50+0*-63.25+0*-63.25)  + 
0.95*(0.5*(0.9*91+0*68.25+0*45.5+0.1*45.5) + 
0.5*(0*68.25+0.5*45.5+0.2*22.75+0.3*22.75) + 0*(0*45.5+0*22.75+0.9*0+0.1*0) + 
0*(0*45.5+0*22.75+0*0+1.0*0))  + 
0.952*(0.5*(0.9*(0.9*91+0*68.25+0*45.5+0.1*45.5) + 
0*(0*68.25+0.5*45.5+0.2*22.75+0.3*22.75) + 0*(0*45.5+0*22.75+0.9*0+0.1*0) + 
0.1*(0*45.5+0*22.75+0*0+1.0*0))    +    0.5*(0*(0.9*91+0*68.25+0*45.5+0.1*45.5) + 
0.5*(0*68.25+0.5*45.5+0.2*22.75+0.3*22.75) + 0*(0*45.5+0*22.75+0.9*0+0.1*0) + 
0*(0*45.5+0*22.75+0*0+1.0*0))    +    0*(0*(0.9*91+0*68.25+0*45.5+0.1*45.5) + 
0*(0*68.25+0.5*45.5+0.2*22.75+0.3*22.75) + 0.9*(0*45.5+0*22.75+0.9*0+0.1*0) + 
0.1*(0*45.5+0*22.75+0*0+1.0*0))    +    0*(0.1* (0.9*91+0*68.25+0*45.5+0.1*45.5) + 
0*(0*68.25+0.5*45.5+0.2*22.75+0.3*22.75) + 0*(0*45.5+0*22.75+0.9*0+0.1*0) + 
1.0*(0*45.5+0*22.75+0*0+1.0*0))). 
 
FIGURE 3 POLICY GRAPH FOR THE REGULATOR WHEN THE TIME HORIZON IS 3 PERIODS. 
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TABLE 3 NET BENEFIT OF ACTION SETS 0AND 1 FOR EACH INITIAL STATE OF THE LAND. 
Action Set  1st period  2nd, 3rd period  Undegw  Degwood1  Degwood2  Agric 
0  Reveg  No Contract  $157  $71  -$31  -$38 
1  No Contract  No Contract  $224  $58  $0  $0 
 
FIVE-PERIOD ANNUAL PLANNING HORIZON 
Given a five- period time horizon, the regulator will engage in monitoring when there is 
uncertainty about the initial state of the being land Undeg, Degw1, Degw2 and/or Agric. 
Figure 4 shows how the regulator would undertake monitoring with Action Sets 0 and 1, 
both an initial period of Reveg followed by periods of Reveg or No Contract depending on 
the observed land type. Table 4 indicates that Action Set 3 is optimal when the land type 
is known to be Undgw, Degw2 or Agric. When the land type is known to be Degw1 the 
optimal Action Set is Action Set 1. Action Set 0 is optimal in situation such as when the 
probability of the land being Degw1 or Degw2 is 50:50. Action Set 2 is optimal in other 
situations again, such as when the probability of the land type being Undgw or Degw1 is 
50:50.  
 
FIGURE 4 POLICY GRAPH FOR THE REGULATOR WHEN THE TIME HORIZON IS 5 PERIODS. 
 
TABLE 4 NET BENEFIT RANGE OF ACTIONS 0 TO 3 DEPENDING ON THE INITIAL STATE OF THE LAND. 
Action Set  Initial Action  Undegw  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
0  Reveg & Monitoring  $249  $135  -$8  -$19 
1  Reveg & Monitoring  $249  $137  -$12  -$25 
2  Reveg & No Monitoring  $269  $132  -$14  -$23 
3  No Contract & No Monitoring  $324  $63  $0  $0 
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TEN-PERIOD ANNUAL PLANNING HORIZON 
Continuing the analysis for a 10- period/year time horizon for the regulator further 
increases the number of Action Sets, to 40, with all combinations of Reveg, Maintain or 
No Contract with and without Monitoring being optimal in certain circumstances, except 
for No Contract without Monitoring. Table 5 gives the range of net benefits from each 
initial action in the 40 Action Sets. The full sequence of actions and net present value of 
the benefits are available in Appendix 1. When the initial land is predicted to be Undegw 
the optimal initial action is to Reveg with or without monitoring. For an expected initial 
state of Degw1 the optimal first action is Reveg or Maintain with monitoring. While a 
high probability of the land being Degw2 or Agric leads the regulator to Reveg with 
Monitoring. When the land type is uncertain Maintain with monitoring is preferred. The 
subsequent action(s) will vary depending on the predicted  
 
TABLE 5 NET BENEFIT RANGE OF ACTIONS 0 TO 40 DEPENDING ON THE INITIAL STATE OF THE LAND. 
1st period  Undegw  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
Reveg , No Monitoring  $480  $92  -$86  -$120 
Reveg & Monitoring  $375-416  $281-289  $115-127  $97-107 
Maintain, No Monitoring  $474-480  $94-115  -$61-72  -$82-68 
Maintain & Monitoring  $416-463  $184-289  $59-115  $26-97 
No Contract & Monitoring  $460-474  $114-184  $49-85  $26-68 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is can be beneficial to government and non-government conservation agencies and/or 
their agents (regulators) to incorporate multiple contract types, and monitoring into 
conservation programs for native remnants. The value of multiple contract types and 
monitoring depends on the regulator’s decision time horizon and the expected initial 
state of the vegetation. The case study shows a conservation agency only contracts for 
revegetation work when their decision time horizon is 3-periods or greater and the land 
type is expected to be partly degraded woodland. A short decision horizon with either 
quality woodland, very degraded woodland or agricultural lans means no conservation 
contract is entered into. The social cost from creating quality woodland outweighs the 
benefit of establishing it in very degraded bush or agricultural land. In land currently 
undegraded it is better to ‘run down’ the value of the land as the degradation does not 
substantially affect the social benefit from the woodland in the short-term. 
With a longer decision horizon the analysis indicates conservation agencies should 
engage in a wider variety of conservation contracts, depending on the state of the land. 
In the medium to long-term, it is optimal for a regulator may contract land for 
revegetation work when the land is more likely to be degraded woodland or agricultural 
land, maintenance of the existing woodland is preferred when the initial land type is 
unknown, while not contract the land is optimal if there is a high probability the land is 
either undegraded woodland or agricultural. Monitoring is valuable to the regulator as it 
enables them to more efficiently contract degraded and agricultural land types. The 16 
 
increases in the average NPV from monitoring of conservation contracts to revegetate 
range from $196 to $219, and for a maintenance contract from $71 to $125, assuming a 
10-period annual decision horizon. Monitoring is not beneficial when the initial land 
type is undegraded woodland as the contract type does not vary. The flexibility of 
contracting land for a variety of conservation works, and responding to information 
from monitoring, enables the conservation agency to respond opportunistically to 
vegetation succession over the longer term and thereby more efficiently achieve their 
goal of providing environmental services. This is particularly the case in situations 
where there is doubt about the current state of the land. 
The analysis shows that undertaking monitoring and consequently altering the 
conservation contract as the vegetation changes may be valuable to conservation 
schemes. Conservation agencies or regulators with a very short-term planning horizon 
for decision making are less likely to benefit from monitoring the vegetation succession 
or the outcome of conservation contracts. The current trial conservation programs with 
short-term contracts would fall into this category. The case study supports the current 
practice of not monitoring short-term conservation contracts as monitoring is not 
optimal for any combination of the land type being undegraded or degraded woodland 
or agricultural when the contract is shorter than 5 years and contracts are negotiated 
annually. Future work will investigate the use of monitoring in longer-term contracts. 
The POMDP framework presents a flexible approach to determine optimal actions 
where the stochastic process is represented by a Markov chain. Given the Smallwood 
and Sondik (1973) algorithm is reasonably robust and that Markov chains are familiar to 
ecologists as a method for modelling environmental change means that this approach 
has the potential to contribute to the analysis of monitoring systems and may lead to 
significant savings in monitoring costs.  Currently monitoring is often undertaken as a 
matter of routine rather than relating monitoring to the actual predicted rates of 
vegetation change. 
This paper has only presented a small set of results on the impact on optimal contract 
design and the use of monitoring of different assumptions.  Further research will 
address the broader economic literature on monitoring, namely the incentives for 
compliance and cheating by landholders, and the enforcement and renegotiation 
strategies for the regulator. 
REFERENCES 
Anderson TW, Goodman LA (1957) Statistical Inference about Markov Chains. The 
Annals of Mathematical Statistics 28, 89-110. 
 




Barber MC (1978) A Markovian model for ecosystem flow analysis. Ecological Modelling 
5, 193-206. 
 
Becker GS (1968) Crime and punishment an economic approach. Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217. 
 
Bertsekas D (1978) 'Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete Time Case.' (Academic: 
New York). 
 
Cassandra AR (1995) 'Optimal policies for partially observable Markov decision 
processes.' (Department of Computer Science, Brown University). 
 
Craig BA, Sendi PP (2002) Estimation of the Transition Matrix of a Discrete-time Markov 
Chain. Health Economics 11, 33-42. 
 
DEWR (2007) 'Annual Report 2006-07.' (Department of the Environment and Water 
Resources, Australian Government: Canberra). 
 
Farm Policy Team (2006) Farm and Commodity Policy: Program Provisions. (Economic 
Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture: Washington DC). 
 
Figgis P (2004) 'Conservation on private lands: the Australian experience.' (IUCN: Grand 
and Cambridge). 
 
Gibbons P, Freudenberger D (2006) An overview of methods used to assess vegetation 
condition at the scale of the site. Ecological Management & Restoration 7, S10-S17. 
 
Gole C, Burton M, Williams KJ, Clayton H, Faith DP, White B, Huggett A, Margules C 
(2005) 'Auctions for Landscape Recovery Final Report.' (World Wide Fund for Nature - 
Australia: Sydney). 
 
Government of Western Australia (2004) 'Biodiversity Incentive Programs in Western 
Australia.' (Department of Environment, Government of Western Australia: Perth). 
 
Greenberg J (1984) Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach. 
Journal of Economic Theory 32, 1-13. 18 
 
 
Hanrahan CE, Zinn J (2005) 'Green payments in U.S. and European Union agricultural 
policy.' (Congressional Research Service report for Congress: Washington). 
 
Harrington W (1988) Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted. Journal of 
Public Economics 37, 240. 
 
Heyes A (2000) Implementing environmental regulation: compliance and enforcement. 
Journal of Regulatory Economics 17, 107-129. 
 
Heyes AG (2002) A Theory of Filtered Enforcement. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 43, 34-46. 
 
Hooper J (1992) Measurement and perception of change:  field monitoring of 
environmental change in the Environmentally Sensitive Areas. In 'Land Use Change and 
it Consequences'. (Ed. MC Whitby). (HMSO: London). 
 
Korotkov VN, Logofet DO, Loreau M (2001) Succession in mixed boreal forest of Russia: 
Markov models and non-Markov effects. Ecological Modelling 142, 25-38. 
 
Lane D (1989) A Partially Observable Model Of Decision Making By Fishermen. 
Operations Research 37, 240. 
 
Li B-L (1995) Stability analysis of a nonhomogeneous Markovian landscape model. 
Ecological Modelling 82, 247-256. 
 
Liu D, Kelly M, Gong P (2006) A spatial–temporal approach to monitoring forest disease 
spread using multi-temporal high spatial resolution imagery. Remote Sensing of 
Environment 101, 167-180. 
 
Lockwood M, Walpole S, Miles C (2000) Economics of remnant native vegetation 
conservation on private property, National Research and Development Program on 
Rehabilitation, Management and Conservation of Remnant Vegetation Research Report. 
Land and Water Resources Research and Development Corporation, Canberra. 
 19 
 
Logofet DO, Korotkov VN (2002) `Hybrid' optimisation: a heuristic solution to the 
Markov-chain calibration problem. Ecological Modelling 151, 51-61. 
 
Logofet DO, Lesnaya EV (2000) The mathematics of Markov models: What Markov 
chains can really predict in forest successions. Ecological Modelling 126, 285-298. 
 
Monahan GE (1982) A Survey of Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes: 
Theory, Models, and Algorithms. Management Science 37, 240. 
 
NAPSWQ (2008) National Market-Based Instruments Pilot Programme. (National Action 
Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, Australian Government: Canberra). 
 
National Audit Office (1997) 'Protecting Environmentally Sensitive Areas.' (HMSO: 
London). 
 
NE (2006) 'Strategic Direction 2006-2009.' (Natural England: London). 
 
Plotnick RE, Gardner RH (2002) A general model for simulating the effects of landscape 
heterogeneity and disturbance on community patterns. Ecological Modelling 147, 171-
197. 
 
Smallwood RD, Sondik EJ (1973) The optimal control of partially observable markov 
processes over a finite horizon. Operations Research 21, 1071-1088. 
 
Somodi I, Viragh K, Aszalos (2004) The effect of the abandonment of grazing on the 
mosaic of vegetation patches in a temperate grassland area in Hungary. Ecological 
Complexity 1, 177-189. 
 
Tucker BC, Anand M (2005) On the use of stationary versus hidden Markov models to 
detect simple versus complex ecological dynamics. Ecological Modelling 185, 177-193. 
 
Usher MB (1979) Markovian Approaches to Ecological Succession. Journal of Animal 
Ecology 48, 413-426. 
 
Walters CJ, Holling CS (1990) Large-Scale Management Experiments and Learning by 
Doing. Operations Research 37, 240. 20 
 
 
White B (2000) An economic analysis of ecological monitoring. Ecological Modelling 
189, 241-250. 
 
Williams BK (1996) Adaptive optimization and the harvest of biological populations. 
Mathematical Biosciences 136, 1-20. 
 
World Bank (1998) 'Guidelines for Monitoring and Evaluation of Biodiversity Projects.' 
(Global Environment Division World Bank: Washington). 
 
WWF (2007) 'Annual Report 2007.' (World Wide Fund for Nature - Australia: Sydney). 
 
Yates CJ, Hobbs RJ (1997) Woodland restoration in the Western Australian wheatbelt: A 
conceptual framework using a state and transition model. Restoration Ecology 5, 28-35. 
 
Yemshanov D, Perera AH (2002) A spatially explicit stochastic model to simulate boreal 






Table 6details the optimal actions and their net present value given a 1-period to 10-
period time horizon for the regulator. The initial column is the period in time the action 
is optimal for, with the Action Set and action named in columns 2 and 3. Columns 4 to 8 
give the number of the Action Set to be taken in the following period depending on if 
monitoring has occurred and if so what was observed. For example, in period 6 for 
Action Set 4 the initial action is Reveg with Monitoring, were the regulator to monitor 
and observe Undegw or Agric land they would undertake Action Set 3 of time period 5 
next (No Contract without Monitoring). If the regulator observed Degw1 they would 
undertake Action Set 2 of period 5 next (Reveg without Monitoring), but if they observed 
Degw2 the regulator would undertake Action Set 0 (Reveg with monitoring). The process 
would then be repeated as above for the actions undertaken in time period 5. The 
sequence of actions is combined with the probability of vegetation succession for each 
action and accuracy of monitoring from the transition probability matrix, as well as the 
benefit and costs of the action and land type, to give the net present value of each Action 
Set and land type in columns 9 to 12. 
The Action Set number is underlined in Table 6 to indicate when an Action Set is not 
optimal as a subsequent Action Set, only as an initial action when the time horizon is 
equal to the time period. In the case of a 9 period time horizon there are 59 Action Sets 
that are optimal as initial actions but only 26 of these Aciton Sets are referenced as an 
action to follow from a 10 period Action Set. The extensive Action Set list is therefore not 
necessarily indicative of a large range of optimal actions in that period,when the 
decision time horizon is a longer time period. 
 




Set  Initial Action 
No 
Monitor  Undegw  Degw1  Degw2  Agric  Undegw  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
1  0  No Contract, No Monitor  0              $169  $67  $0  $0 
2  0  No Contract, No Monitor  0              $160  $50  $0  $0 
3  0  Reveg, No Monitor  0              $157  $71  -$31  -$38 
3  1  No Contract, No Monitor  0              $224  $58  $0  $0 
4  0  Reveg, No Monitor  1              $217  $105  -$21  -$29 
4  1  No Contract, No Monitor  1              $278  $62  $0  $0 
5  0  Reveg & Monitor     1  0  1  1  $249  $135  -$8  -$19 
5  1  Reveg & Monitor     1  0  0  1  $249  $137  -$12  -$25 
5  2  Reveg, No Monitor  1              $269  $132  -$14  -$23 
5  3  No Contract, No Monitor  1              $324  $63  $0  $0 
6  0  Reveg, No Monitor  0              $242  $153  $15  -$2 
6  1  Reveg, No Monitor  2              $260  $161  $13  -$4 
6  2  Reveg & Monitor     3  1  0  3  $290  $171  $10  -$5 
6  3  Reveg & Monitor     3  1  1  3  $290  $171  $8  -$7 22 
 
6  4  Reveg & Monitor     3  2  0  3  $294  $171  $8  -$6 
6  5  Reveg & Monitor     3  2  1  3  $294  $171  $7  -$8 
6  6  Reveg, No Monitor  3              $313  $155  -$9  -$17 
6  7  No Contract, No Monitor  3              $363  $64  $0  $0 
7  0  Reveg, No Monitor  2              $281  $190  $42  $23 
7  1  Reveg, No Monitor  4              $284  $192  $42  $23 
7  2  Reveg & Monitor     7  4  0  0  $329  $204  $36  $18 
7  3  Reveg & Monitor     7  5  0  0  $329  $204  $36  $18 
7  4  Reveg & Monitor     7  5  1  0  $329  $205  $36  $18 
7  5  Reveg & Monitor     7  5  2  0  $329  $205  $35  $17 
7  6  Reveg & Monitor     7  5  3  0  $329  $205  $35  $17 
7  7  Reveg & Monitor     7  5  5  0  $329  $205  $34  $16 
7  8  Reveg & Monitor     7  6  2  0  $332  $201  $29  $12 
7  9  Reveg & Monitor     7  6  3  0  $332  $201  $28  $12 
7  10  Reveg & Monitor     7  6  5  0  $332  $201  $28  $11 
7  11  Reveg, No Monitor  7              $350  $174  -$5  -$13 
7  12  Maintain & Monitor     7  4  0  0  $373  $135  -$22  -$52 
7  13  Maintain & Monitor     7  5  1  7  $373  $135  -$24  -$51 
7  14  Maintain & Monitor     7  5  0  0  $373  $135  -$22  -$52 
7  15  Maintain & Monitor     7  5  2  7  $373  $135  -$26  -$51 
7  16  Maintain & Monitor     7  5  1  0  $373  $135  -$23  -$53 
7  17  Maintain & Monitor     7  5  2  0  $373  $135  -$25  -$53 
7  18  Maintain & Monitor     7  6  0  0  $376  $126  -$25  -$52 
7  19  Maintain & Monitor     7  6  2  7  $376  $126  -$29  -$51 
7  20  Maintain & Monitor     7  6  1  0  $376  $126  -$26  -$53 
7  21  Maintain & Monitor     7  6  2  0  $376  $126  -$28  -$53 
7  22  Maintain, No Monitor  7              $394  $78  -$34  -$42 
7  23  No Contract, No Monitor  7              $397  $65  $0  $0 
8  0  Reveg, No Monitor  4              $318  $224  $72  $52 
8  1  Reveg, No Monitor  5              $318  $225  $72  $52 
8  2  Reveg & Monitor     22  5  1  0  $359  $235  $65  $46 
8  3  Reveg & Monitor     23  5  1  0  $361  $235  $64  $46 
8  4  Reveg & Monitor     23  5  4  0  $361  $236  $63  $45 
8  5  Reveg & Monitor     23  5  5  0  $361  $236  $63  $44 
8  6  Reveg & Monitor     23  6  5  0  $361  $236  $63  $44 
8  7  Reveg & Monitor     23  7  5  0  $361  $236  $63  $44 
8  8  Reveg & Monitor     23  7  6  0  $361  $236  $63  $44 
8  9  Reveg & Monitor     23  7  7  0  $361  $236  $62  $44 
8  10  Maintain & Monitor     23  5  1  0  $405  $164  $4  -$28 
8  11  Maintain & Monitor     23  8  1  0  $406  $161  $3  -$28 
8  12  No Contract & Monitor     23  4  0  0  $409  $131  $30  $14 
8  13  No Contract & Monitor     23  5  0  0  $409  $131  $30  $14 
8  14  No Contract & Monitor     23  8  0  0  $409  $129  $29  $14 
8  15  No Contract & Monitor     23  11  0  0  $412  $118  $26  $14 23 
 
8  16  No Contract & Monitor     23  17  1  0  $416  $103  $25  $14 
8  17  No Contract & Monitor     23  12  0  0  $416  $103  $25  $14 
8  18  No Contract & Monitor     23  14  0  0  $416  $103  $25  $14 
8  19  No Contract & Monitor     23  16  0  0  $416  $103  $25  $14 
8  20  No Contract & Monitor     23  17  0  0  $416  $103  $25  $14 
8  21  No Contract & Monitor     23  18  0  0  $417  $100  $25  $14 
8  22  No Contract & Monitor     23  20  0  0  $417  $100  $25  $14 
8  23  No Contract & Monitor     23  21  0  0  $417  $100  $24  $14 
8  24  No Contract & Monitor     23  22  0  0  $420  $81  $24  $14 
8  25  No Contract & Monitor     23  23  0  0  $420  $77  $27  $14 
8  26  No Contract, No Monitor  23              $426  $65  $0  $0 
8  27  Maintain, No Monitor  23              $426  $82  -$34  -$42 
9  0  Reveg, No Monitor  3              $348  $254  $100  $80 
9  1  Reveg & Monitor     27  6  1  0  $390  $263  $92  $74 
9  2  Reveg & Monitor     27  6  1  1  $390  $263  $92  $74 
9  3  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  1  0  $390  $263  $92  $74 
9  4  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  1  1  $390  $263  $92  $74 
9  5  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  2  0  $390  $264  $91  $72 
9  6  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  2  1  $390  $264  $91  $72 
9  7  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  3  0  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  8  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  3  1  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  9  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  4  0  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  10  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  4  1  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  11  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  5  0  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  12  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  5  1  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  13  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  6  0  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  14  Reveg & Monitor     27  7  6  1  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  15  Reveg & Monitor     27  8  6  0  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  16  Reveg & Monitor     27  8  6  1  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  17  Reveg & Monitor     27  8  7  0  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  18  Reveg & Monitor     27  8  7  1  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  19  Reveg & Monitor     27  9  7  0  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  20  Reveg & Monitor     27  9  7  1  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  21  Reveg & Monitor     27  9  9  1  $390  $264  $90  $72 
9  22  Maintain & Monitor     27  5  1  0  $434  $192  $32  -$1 
9  23  Maintain & Monitor     27  6  1  0  $434  $192  $32  -$1 
9  24  Maintain & Monitor     27  5  1  1  $434  $192  $32  -$1 
9  25  Maintain & Monitor     27  7  1  0  $434  $192  $32  -$1 
9  26  Maintain & Monitor     27  6  1  1  $434  $192  $32  -$1 
9  27  Maintain & Monitor     27  7  1  1  $434  $192  $32  -$1 
9  28  No Contract & Monitor     27  3  1  0  $437  $158  $58  $41 
9  29  No Contract & Monitor     27  4  1  0  $437  $159  $58  $41 
9  30  No Contract & Monitor     27  5  1  0  $437  $159  $58  $41 
9  31  No Contract & Monitor     27  6  1  0  $437  $159  $58  $41 24 
 
9  32  No Contract & Monitor     27  7  1  0  $437  $159  $58  $41 
9  33  No Contract & Monitor     27  6  0  0  $437  $159  $58  $41 
9  34  No Contract & Monitor     27  7  0  0  $437  $159  $58  $41 
9  35  Maintain & Monitor     27  10  1  0  $442  $153  $22  -$1 
9  36  Maintain & Monitor     27  10  1  1  $442  $153  $22  -$1 
9  37  No Contract & Monitor     27  10  1  0  $444  $130  $53  $41 
9  38  No Contract & Monitor     27  10  0  0  $444  $130  $53  $41 
9  39  No Contract & Monitor     27  11  1  0  $444  $129  $53  $41 
9  40  No Contract & Monitor     27  11  0  0  $444  $129  $53  $41 
9  41  No Contract & Monitor     27  13  1  0  $445  $118  $55  $41 
9  42  No Contract & Monitor     27  14  1  0  $445  $117  $55  $41 
9  43  No Contract & Monitor     27  17  1  0  $446  $107  $54  $41 
9  44  No Contract & Monitor     27  18  1  0  $446  $107  $54  $41 
9  45  No Contract & Monitor     27  19  1  0  $446  $107  $54  $41 
9  46  No Contract & Monitor     27  18  0  0  $446  $107  $54  $41 
9  47  No Contract & Monitor     27  19  0  0  $446  $107  $54  $41 
9  48  No Contract & Monitor     27  21  1  0  $446  $106  $54  $41 
9  49  No Contract & Monitor     27  22  1  0  $446  $106  $54  $41 
9  50  No Contract & Monitor     27  21  0  0  $446  $106  $54  $41 
9  51  No Contract & Monitor     27  22  0  0  $446  $106  $54  $41 
9  52  No Contract & Monitor     27  25  1  0  $447  $97  $55  $41 
9  53  No Contract & Monitor     27  25  0  0  $447  $97  $55  $41 
9  54  No Contract & Monitor     27  26  1  0  $448  $92  $52  $41 
9  55  No Contract & Monitor     27  26  0  0  $448  $92  $52  $41 
9  56  No Contract & Monitor     27  27  1  0  $448  $98  $49  $41 
9  57  No Contract & Monitor     27  27  0  0  $448  $98  $49  $41 
9  58  Maintain, No Monitor  26              $454  $85  -$34  -$42 
9  59  Maintain, No Monitor  27              $454  $90  -$61  -$82 
10  0  Reveg, No Monitor  4              $480  $92  -$86  -$120 
10  1  Reveg & Monitor     36  8  0  0  $375  $281  $127  $107 
10  2  Reveg & Monitor     36  10  0  0  $407  $287  $120  $102 
10  3  Reveg & Monitor     59  8  0  0  $407  $287  $120  $102 
10  4  Reveg & Monitor     59  10  0  0  $416  $289  $118  $100 
10  5  Reveg & Monitor     59  12  0  0  $416  $289  $118  $100 
10  6  Reveg & Monitor     59  14  0  0  $416  $289  $118  $100 
10  7  Reveg & Monitor     59  16  0  0  $416  $289  $118  $100 
10  8  Reveg & Monitor     59  16  4  0  $416  $289  $118  $100 
10  9  Reveg & Monitor     59  20  4  0  $416  $289  $116  $98 
10  10  Reveg & Monitor     59  20  6  0  $416  $289  $116  $98 
10  11  Reveg & Monitor     59  20  8  0  $416  $289  $116  $97 
10  12  Reveg & Monitor     59  20  10  0  $416  $289  $116  $97 
10  13  Reveg & Monitor     59  20  12  0  $416  $289  $115  $97 
10  14  Reveg & Monitor     59  21  20  0  $416  $289  $115  $97 
10  15  Reveg & Monitor     59  21  21  0  $416  $289  $115  $97 25 
 
10  16  Maintain & Monitor     59  8  0  0  $416  $289  $115  $97 
10  17  Maintain & Monitor     59  10  0  0  $460  $217  $59  $26 
10  18  No Contract & Monitor     59  4  0  0  $460  $217  $59  $26 
10  19  No Contract & Monitor     59  6  0  0  $463  $184  $85  $68 
10  20  No Contract & Monitor     59  8  0  0  $463  $184  $85  $68 
10  21  No Contract & Monitor     59  10  0  0  $463  $184  $85  $68 
10  22  Maintain & Monitor     59  27  0  0  $463  $184  $85  $68 
10  23  No Contract & Monitor     59  27  0  0  $468  $179  $49  $26 
10  24  No Contract & Monitor     59  28  0  0  $471  $156  $80  $68 
10  25  No Contract & Monitor     59  29  0  0  $471  $144  $82  $68 
10  26  No Contract & Monitor     59  36  0  0  $471  $144  $82  $68 
10  27  No Contract & Monitor     59  37  0  0  $472  $141  $79  $68 
10  28  No Contract & Monitor     59  39  0  0  $472  $133  $81  $68 
10  29  No Contract & Monitor     59  41  0  0  $473  $133  $81  $68 
10  30  No Contract & Monitor     59  42  0  0  $473  $128  $82  $68 
10  31  No Contract & Monitor     59  43  0  0  $473  $128  $82  $68 
10  32  No Contract & Monitor     59  45  0  0  $473  $124  $81  $68 
10  33  No Contract & Monitor     59  49  0  0  $473  $124  $81  $68 
10  34  No Contract & Monitor     59  52  0  0  $473  $124  $81  $68 
10  35  No Contract & Monitor     59  54  0  0  $473  $121  $81  $68 
10  36  No Contract & Monitor     59  56  0  0  $473  $119  $81  $68 
10  37  No Contract & Monitor     59  58  0  0  $473  $121  $81  $68 
10  38  No Contract & Monitor     59  59  0  0  $474  $114  $74  $68 
10  39  Maintain, No Monitor  58              $474  $115  $72  $68 
10  40  Maintain, No Monitor  59              $480  $94  -$61  -$82 
 
 